Presently, many identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) schemes have been proposed, but most of them are constructed in the random oracle model. Also, the proposed security model for IBPS is not enough complete according to Boldyreva's work. Cao and Cao proposed an IBPS scheme in the standard model. However, their scheme is not secure because of not resisting the attack of delegator and requires more computation cost. In this paper, we present a framework for IBPS and show a detailed security model for IBPS. Under our framework, we present an efficient IBPS scheme in the standard model. Compared with other IBPS schemes, the proposed scheme has more complete security and is more efficient.
INTRODUCTION
Proxy signature (PS) is a practical cryptographic primitive [1] , which is a variant of ordinary signature [2] [3] [4] . Compared with ordinary signature schemes, PS schemes have four security properties [1, 5] , which are unforgeability, non-repudiation, strong identifiability and prevention of misuse. A provable security model for PS was first proposed by Boldyreva et al. [1] . Then many researchers and scholars proposed some improved security models for PS [6] [7] [8] [9] , which are based on Boldyreva's model [1] . Boldyreva et al. [1] described what the security standards for PS are, and proposed a provable security model for PS which is based on register key model. Although their security model provides a strict standard for proving security of a PS scheme, the concept of warrant 1 is not introduced into their model. Because the warrant is considered the important information involving signing rights, their security model is not complete. Malkin et al. [7] proposed a provable security model for hierarchical PS. Although the concept of warrant is introduced into their security model [7] , their model is very complicated and is not suitable for proving the security of a PS scheme. In Schuldt et al. [8] , further strengthen the security model for hierarchical PS by considering exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys (not just self-delegated proxy keys). However, their security model is also very complicated. In [9] [10] [11] , the security models for PS defined three types of attacks. However, the three types of attacks lack the logical relationship, so whether the three types of attacks can completely cover all attacks still needs to be studied in PS schemes. Also, the scheme proposed by Zhang and Mao [11] is not secure because of not resisting the attack of original signer by substituting publickey. Fuchsbauer et al. [6] proposed a generalized provable security model for group signature and PS, which defines the security of signing rights based on the mixed concept of group signature and PS. But their model is still not complete. Recently, Boldyreva et al. summarized related work about the provable security models for PS [1, 7, 8, 12] in [5] . Boldyreva et al. [5] proposed a more accurate security model for PS. In their security model, the security of a PS scheme needs to be analyzed in four situations, and generating self-PS is considered a weak secure situation [1, 5] . However, Boldyreva et al. did not consider exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys in their security model. Thus, Schuldt's work [8] is not introduced to their security Efficient Identity-Based Proxy Signature in the Standard Model 793 model. Furthermore, the proposed security models are based on public key cryptography and do not involve the concept of identity. With the development of identity-based cryptography, it is necessary to research and develop PS based on identitybased cryptography.
Identity-based cryptography is another cryptographic primitive, which was first introduced by Shamir. In identitybased cryptography, a user's public key is obtained from his/her public identity, such as name, IP address and email address. Then, the user's private key is distributed from a private key generator (PKG). The main target of application of identity-based cryptography is to simplify key management and remove public key certificates. Owing to the contributions of [3, 4, 13, 14] , a rapid development of identity-based cryptography has taken place. Boneh and Franklin [13] proposed an identity-based encryption scheme in the random oracle model. Waters [4] proposed an efficient identity-based encryption scheme in the standard model. Then, based on their works, many researchers proposed more and more identity-based signature (IBS) schemes in the random oracle model or standard model [3, [15] [16] [17] . Also, with these IBS schemes, a lot of variants, such as identity-based proxy signature (IBPS) scheme [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] and identity-based ring signature scheme [25, 26] , have also been proposed. Thus, IBPS is a special identity-based cryptography, which is a combination of PS and identity-based cryptography. Comparing with PS based on public key cryptography, IBPS can simplify key management and be more easily used for many applications, such as distributed systems, grid computing, mobile agent applications, distributed shared object systems, global distribution networks and mobile communications. Then we focus on IBPS in this paper.
Compared with public-key-based PS, the security requirements of IBPS have the following: Unforgeability: A valid IBPS signature must be signed by a proxy signer with a warrant delegated by a delegator. Therefore, no poly-time adversary can produce a valid IBPS signature on any identities and messages when the adversary may adaptively be permitted to choose identities and messages after executing key oracle and signature oracle 2 (see the security model of Section 5 for more details). Non-repudiation: A valid IBPS signature for a message must be approved by the delegator and proxy signer. It means that the delegator and proxy signer cannot deny signing the message. Strong identifiability: A valid IBPS signature for a message must reveal the identities of the delegator and proxy signer. Although a user's public key is replaced by his/her public identity in IBPS, such as name, IP address or email address, the IBPS signature must identify who the delegator and the proxy signer are (whose identities can satisfy the IBPS signature).
Prevention of misuse:
The security property is the same as that of public-key-based PS. It means that any valid IBPS signature must be generated by a valid proxy signer on a valid warrant.
Because IBPS has more advantages than public-key-based PS in key management, IBPS is a natural choice for many earlier mentioned applications. Thus, our motivation for developing such IBPS scheme also comes from the requirements of the applications.
Presently, many public-key-based PS schemes [6, [10] [11] [12] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] are proposed in the random oracle model or standard model, which are based on various mathematical problem assumptions, such as computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem [9, 10, 28, 34, 36, 42] , factoring problem [40] , discrete logarithm problem [27, 29, 30, 35] and extended kplus problem [39] . Also, based on identity-based cryptography, many variants of public-key-based PS are proposed [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [46] [47] [48] [49] . The first IBPS scheme was proposed in [24] , but it lacked a formal security model. Then the first formal security model for IBPS was proposed in [23] . Unfortunately, the security model is not complete because of lacking the security analysis for self-proxy signing. Gu and Zhu [19] provided a general security model for IBPS. However, their model is still not complete. Hence, based on the works of [19, 23, 24] , more and more IBPS schemes are proposed [18, [20] [21] [22] . In [15, 20, 21] , the security models are not complete enough according to Boldyreva's work (the work of [21] considered exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys). In [22] , the security models defined three types of attacks. However, the three types of attacks lack the logical relationship. Furthermore, the proposed schemes [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] are still constructed in the random oracle model. Cao and Cao [47] proposed an IBPS scheme in the standard model. However, their security model is not complete. Thus, their scheme is not secure because of not resisting the attack of delegator. Also, their scheme requires more computation cost. Additionally, to make secure PS schemes against quantum analysis, Kim et al. [49] proposed a provably secure IBPS scheme based on the lattice problems in the adaptive security model. Because of requiring many computations based on matrix, their scheme is not efficient under the current framework of computer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our contributions; in Section 3, we review the bilinear pairings and complexity assumptions on which we build; in Section 4, we show a framework for IBPS; in Section 5, we set up the security model for IBPS; in Section 6, we propose an IBPS scheme in the standard model and in Section 7, we analyze the correctness, efficiency and security of the proposed scheme. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 8.
OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we present an efficient IBPS scheme in the standard model. Compared with other IBPS schemes proposed by [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] in the random oracle model, the proposed scheme is constructed in the standard model and is efficient. Furthermore, compared with Cao's scheme [47] in the standard model, the proposed scheme is secure and decreases the computation cost. In this paper, our contributions are as follows:
(i) We present a fully secure (adaptive-identity unforgeable) IBPS scheme in the standard model. No poly-time adversary can produce a valid IBPS signature on any identities and messages when the adversary may adaptively be permitted to choose identities and messages after executing key oracle and signature oracle. (ii) We present a framework for IBPS, and show a detailed security model for IBPS. Compared with the security models for IBPS [19, 23, 24] , we introduce Boldyreva's model [5] and Schuldt's work [8] to our security model. We further strengthen our security model by considering self-proxy signing and exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys. Under our security model, the proposed IBPS scheme is proved to be secure in the standard model, and has a security reduction to the simple standard assumption (CDH assumption).
Remark 2.1. Wen et al. [21] considered exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys. However, the proposed security model [21] still lacks the security analysis for self-proxy signing according to Boldyreva's work [5] .
(iii) The proposed IBPS scheme is efficient by reducing the amount of computations and communications. Compared with the public-key-based PS scheme [9] and the IBPS scheme [47] in the standard model, the proposed IBPS scheme further reduces the computation cost; and compared with another IBPS scheme [20] in the random oracle model, the proposed IBPS scheme also has some advantages (the comparisons of the four schemes are given in Appendix 1).
PRELIMINARIES

Bilinear maps
Let G 1 and G 2 be groups of prime order q and g be a generator of G 1 . We say G 2 has an admissible bilinear map e: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR IBPS
IBPS is an extension of IBS. An IBPS scheme involves an IBS scheme for standard signing [1, 5] . In the section, we present a formal definition of IBPS, which is based on those of Gu and Zhu [19] , Xu et al. [23] and Zhang and Kim [24] . Let A be the universe of possible identities, we set ID ⊆ A as the identity of user. 
SECURITY MODEL
In the section, we show a detailed security model for IBPS. Compared with ordinary IBS schemes, IBPS schemes involve a delegating procedure. Thus, the security models for IBPS are more complicated than the security models for ordinary IBS. Boldyreva et al. [5] proposed an accurate provable security model for PS. Thus, based on the security models of [5, 19, 23, 24] , we show a more complete security model for IBPS by considering exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys.
Remark 5.1. In [8, 21] , the security models have considered exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys.
We assume that one user u * is not corrupted by an adversary in an IBPS scheme. And we maximize the adversary's advantage [8] , where the adversary can get all useful information except for the private key of u * . Based on Boldyreva's work [5] , there are the following four situations for analyzing security of an IBPS scheme:
(1) verifying a standard IBS by the identity of u * ; (2) u * computes an identity-based self-PS after u * delegates his signing rights to oneself; in the situation, u * is a delegator and is also a proxy signer; (3) one user corrupted by an adversary delegates his signing rights to u * , and then the adversary forges an IBPS of the corrupted user which pretends that u * participates in signing; (4) one user corrupted by an adversary does not get the signing rights of u * , and then the adversary uses the corrupted user to forge an IBPS of u * .
Based on the above four situations, we propose a complete security model for IBPS. Typically a security model is described in terms of an adversary A interacting with a challenger C in a security game. However, to make our security model easier to understand, we construct an algorithm B interacting with the adversary, which may make attack experiments to IBPS schemes in the above four situations. And we also introduce Schuldt's work [8] into our security model. We further strengthen our security model by considering exposure arbitrary proxy signing keys. In our security model, we maximize the adversary's advantage, and assume that all the attacking conditions needed by the adversary hold and the adversary may forge signatures after limitedly querying signature oracle in the above four situations. All symbols and parameters are defined as follows in B:
(1) req_key(ID i ⊆ A) represents private key query; the procedure registers one user and outputs a private key on ID i , where i is the indexed number of user and ID i is the identity of the user i; the procedure of req_key() is described as follows:
Remark 5.2. We assume that the public parameters have been generated by the algorithm Setup.
(2) req_proxykey(param1, param2) represents proxy signing key query, which involves delegation query; the procedure of req_proxykey(,) is described as follows:
Remark 5.3. It is responsible for finishing a delegating procedure between a delegator and a proxy signer, and generating a proxy signing key; the symbol * represents the corresponding parameter. param1 and param2 are the input parameters, where param1 is the public parameter and param2 is the warrant of delegator; additionally, req_proxykey(,) outputs a proxy signing key.
(3) req_sig w (·) represents IBPS query or standard IBS query; the procedure of req_sig w (·) is described as follows:
where w is the warrant of delegator, the dot '·'represents a queried message and req_sig w (·) returns a simulated IBPS; in the first situation, w is null, req_sig(·) represents standard IBS query and req_sig(·) returns a simulated standard IBS; (4) versign(param1, param2, param3, param4, param5, param6) represents verification of signature; the procedure of versign(, , , , , ) is described as follows:
all parameters are the input parameters, param1 is the public parameter, param2 is a verified message, param3 is the identity of delegator, param4 is the identity of proxy signer, param5 is the warrant of delegator and param6 is a verified signature; additionally, versign(, , , , , ) returns 1 or 0; in the first situation, versign(param1, param2, param3, param4, param5, param6) represents verification of standard signature, where param1 is the public parameter, param2 is a verified message, param3 is the identity of signer, param4 and param5 are null and param6 is a verified standard signature; (5) k is a secure parameter, A represents an adversary and T represents the types of attack whose value is the enumerable set {type1, type2, type3, type4}, where type1 represents the attack in the first situation, type2 represents the attack in the second situation, type3 represents the attack in the third situation and type4 represents the attack in the fourth situation.
Now, algorithm B is described as follows: 1. Setup: Running Setup and KeyGen, parameters ← Setup(1 k ) and sk ID 1 ← KeyGen(parameters, ID 1 ), where we assume that the user 1 is a no corrupted user (for the simplicity of our description). Then all public parameters and ID 1 are passed to A (ID 1 is the identity of the user 1). 2. Queries: A makes queries to the following oracle for polynomially many times according to four situations: Key Queries:
Given the identity of the user i, the oracle returns a private key sk ID i to A, where i is the indexed number of user and i > 1. (II) T = type2 -req_proxykey(,): Given the public parameters and a warrant w of the delegator (the user i), the oracle returns a proxy signing key psk for the proxy signer (the user i) on w to A (psk is valid with respect to the corresponding identities), where w may be an arbitrary forgery generated by A and i is the indexed number of user (i > 1).
(III) T = type3 -req_proxykey(,): Given the public parameters and a warrant w of the delegator (the user i), the oracle returns a proxy signing key psk for the proxy signer (the user 1) on w to A (psk is valid with respect to the corresponding identities), where w may be an arbitrary forgery generated by A and i is the indexed number of user (i > 1). (IV) T = type4 -req_proxykey(,): Given the public parameters and a warrant w of the delegator (the user 1), the oracle returns a proxy signing key psk for the proxy signer (the user i) on w to A (psk is valid with respect to the corresponding identities), where w may be an arbitrary forgery generated by A and i is the indexed number of user (i > 1). Signature Queries: (I) T = type1 -req_sig(·): Given a message M, the oracle returns a simulated standard IBS σ on M to A, which is valid with respect to the corresponding identity. (I) T = type2 or type3 or type4 -req_sig w (·): Given a message M and a warrant w, the oracle returns a simulated IBPS pσ on M and w to A, which is valid with respect to the corresponding identities. 3. Forgery: Algorithm B completely describes a security model for IBPS. Interacting with algorithm B, the adversary A must undergo the system initialization, the stage of queries and the stage of forgery (Fig. 2 describes the procedure of the security model). Additionally, the views generated by the simulators are indistinguishable from the views generated by the actual execution. 
IBPS SCHEME
In the section, we show an IBPS scheme in the standard model under our framework for IBPS. Let IBPS = (IBS, IDelegate, IProxyKeyGen, IProxySign, IProxyVerify) be an IBPS scheme on A, where IBS = (Setup, KeyGen, ISign, IVerify) is an IBS scheme and A is the universe of possible identities. In IBPS, all algorithms are described as follows: Setup: The PKG system inputs a security parameter 1 k . Additionally, let G 1 and G 2 be groups of prime order q and g be a generator of G 1 , and let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 denote the bilinear map. The size of the group is determined by the security parameter. And one hash function, H : {0, 1} * → Z 1 k ·q , can be defined and used to generate any integer value in Z 1 k ·q (where 1 k represents the corresponding decimal number). Then the system parameters are generated as follows. The system chooses a random a ∈ Z q and sets g 1 = g a . Five group elements g 2 , μ, υ, and τ ∈ G 1 are randomly chosen. Finally, the system outputs the public parameters IPK = (G 1 , G 2 , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , μ, υ, , τ ) . KeyGen: The PKG system generates a user's private key with respect to the identity of the user. To the identity ID ⊆ A of a user, the system randomly chooses r ∈ Z q , computes
Then the system outputs a private key sk ID = {x 0 , x 1 } for the user. 
Lastly, the algorithm outputs an IBS σ = {X 0 , X 1 , X 2 }.
IVerify:
The algorithm run by the verifier inputs (IPK, ID, M, σ ). Then the algorithm computes
).
If the above equation is equal, then the algorithm outputs the Boolean value accept; otherwise, the algorithm outputs the Boolean value reject. IDelegate: The algorithm run by the delegator inputs (IPK, sk ID de , w), where w is the warrant of the delegator. Then the algorithm chooses a random s ∈ Z q , and computes
and the algorithm outputs a delegation δ = {T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , w} for a proxy signer.
IProxyKeyGen:
The algorithm run by the proxy signer generates a proxy signing key. In the algorithm, the following two steps need to be finished: 
Lastly, the algorithm outputs an IBPS (w, pσ 
If the equation is correct, then the algorithm outputs the Boolean value accept; otherwise, the algorithm outputs the Boolean value reject.
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Correctness
In the proposed scheme, IBPS is (w, pσ
where
pσ may be verified by the following equation:
Efficiency
In the proposed scheme, pσ in τ d·H (M) may be pre-computed, and we assume that the time for integer multiplication and hash computation can be ignored, signing a message needs to compute at most 1 exponentiation in G 1 and 1 multiplication in G 1 . Also, the signature receiver needs to verify an IBPS by the following equation:
Because the value e(g 2 , g 1 ) 2 can be pre-computed and cached, verification requires five pairing computations, one multiplication in G 1 , four exponentiations in G 1 and four multiplications in G 2 .
In this paper, we also compare the proposed scheme (the scheme of Section 6) with the public-key-based PS scheme [9] and the IBPS scheme [47] in the standard model, and another IBPS scheme [20] in the random oracle model. In Appendix 1, we show the comparisons of the four schemes. Additionally, although Kim et al. [49] recently proposed a provably secure IBPS scheme from lattices in the adaptive security model, their scheme is not efficient because of requiring many computations based on matrix. Under the current framework of computer, our scheme is more efficient compared with Kim's scheme.
Security
In the section, we show that the proposed scheme has a security reduction to CDH assumption and the full IBPS unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack. Our proof for Theorem 7.1 is based on the security model of Section 5 (we defer the proof for Theorem 7.1 to Appendix 2). 
and q e is the maximal number of key queries, q s is the maximal number of signature queries and C mul and C exp are respectively the time for a multiplication and an exponentiation in G 1 .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present an efficient IBPS scheme in the standard model. Compared with other IBPS schemes proposed by Gu and Zhu [18, 19] Tables A1-A3 show the comparisons of the four schemes (the scheme of Section 6, Sun's scheme [9] , Cao's scheme [47] and Singh's scheme [20] ). Table A1 shows the key length comparison of the four schemes. Sun's scheme has the shortest key length because Sun's scheme is based on public key cryptography. Similarly, although Singh's scheme is based on identity-based cryptography and has the shorter key length, Singh's scheme still requires public key. Therefore, based on identity-based cryptography, our scheme and Cao's scheme do not require public key. Then our scheme has more advantage in simplifying key management. Table A2 shows the delegation and signature length comparison of the four schemes. Table A3 shows the performance comparison of the four schemes (where we do not consider pre-computation and do assume that Singh's scheme is constructed on multiplicative cyclic group). In Table A3 , compared with Sun's scheme and Cao's scheme, our scheme has more performance advantage in signing and verification, and further reduces the computation cost; and compared with Singh's scheme, our scheme has less performance advantage in signing, but requires more computations in verification (because Singh's scheme employs many hash functions in the random oracle model). Therefore, our scheme is more efficient on the whole by key length, delegation and signature length and performance comparisons of the four schemes.
APPENDIX 1. A COMPARISONS OF FOUR SCHEMES
APPENDIX 2. SECURITY PROOF
A.1. Proof of Theorem 7.1
Proof. Let IBPS be an identity-based PS scheme of Section 6. Additionally, let A be an (t, ε, q e , q s )-adversary attacking IBPS.
From the adversary A, we construct an algorithm B, for (g, g a , g b ) ∈ G 1 , algorithm B is able to use A to compute g ab . Thus, we assume that algorithm B can solve CDH with probability at least ε and in time at most t , contradicting the (t , ε )-CDH assumption. Such a simulation may be created in the following way: Setup: The PKG system inputs a security parameter 1 k . Additionally, let G 1 and G 2 be groups of prime order q and g be a generator of G 1 , and let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 denote the bilinear map. The size of the group is determined by the security parameter, and we set A as the universe of identities. One hash function, H : {0, 1} * → Z 1 k ·q , can be defined and used to generate any integer value in Z 1 k ·q (where 1 k represents the corresponding decimal number).
Then the system parameters are generated as follows. The system sets g 1 = g a and g 2 = g b with a, b ∈ Z q (B does not know a and b), chooses , ∂, λ, η ∈ Z q and then sets μ = g 2 · g,
Then the system outputs the public parameters IPK = (G 1 , G 2 , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , μ, υ, , τ ) . Additionally, because algorithm B does not know a and b, the algorithm constructs a private key sk ID 1 by the following computation (where the user 1 is a no corrupted user and ID 1 ⊆ A is the identity of the user 1): algorithm B chooses a random r 1 ∈ Z q , and computes x 1,0 = g
; then the algorithm generates a private key sk ID 1 = {x 1,0 , x 1,1 }. Finally, ID 1 is passed to A. 
C mul1 represents one multiplication in G 1 , C mul2 represents one multiplication in G 2 , C mul3 represents one multiplication for integer, C exp represents one exponentiation in G 1 , C pairing represents one pairing computation, C h represents one hash computation, C xor represents one XOR computation, n u represents the length of the bit string of identity, n w represents the length of the bit string of warrant and n m represents the length of the bit string of message.
Remark A.1. To the correctness of sk ID 1 , sk ID 1 may be changed as follows:
} is a valid private key, where we assure that
Queries: When running the adversary A, key queries and signature queries can occur. Algorithm B answers these in the following way: Key Queries:
Given an identity ID i ⊆ A of the user i with i > 1, algorithm B similarly constructs a private key
} is a valid private key. Then the algorithm outputs a private key
= 1), then the above computation cannot be performed and the simulator will abort; otherwise, a private key sk ID i is passed to the adversary A.
Given the public parameters and a warrant w of the delegator (the user i), the oracle returns a proxy signing key for the proxy signer (the user i) on w to A, where w may be an arbitrary forgery generated by A and ID i is the identity of the user i with i > 1. In the second situation, the user i is a delegator and is also a proxy signer, so the simulator simulating as the user i needs to delegate his signing rights to oneself. The algorithm randomly chooses r i , s ∈ Z q , and computes
and
where B gets the warrant wand the identity ID i by the query of A. And then algorithm Boutputs a proxy signing key psk pd = {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 }. Similarly, setting 
,
then the above computation cannot be performed and the simulator will abort; otherwise, a proxy signing key psk pd is passed to the adversary A.
Given the public parameters and a warrant w of the delegator (the user i), the oracle returns a proxy signing key for the proxy signer (the user 1) on w to A, where w may be an arbitrary forgery generated by A and ID i is the identity of the user i with i > 1. In the third situation, the user i is a delegator, so the user i needs to delegate his signing rights to the user 1. Algorithm B randomly chooses r i , s ∈ Z q , and then computes
where B gets the warrant w and the identity ID i by the query of A. And then algorithm B outputs a proxy signing key psk pd = {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 }. Similarly, setting
, g s } is a valid proxy signing key.
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Remark A.3. To the correctness of psk pd , psk pd may be changed as follows:
Given the public parameters and a warrant w of the delegator (the user 1), the oracle returns a proxy signing key psk for the proxy signer (the user i) on w to A, where w may be an arbitrary forgery generated by A and ID i is the identity of the user i with i > 1. In the fourth situation, the user 1 is a delegator, so the user 1 needs to delegate his signing rights to the user i. Algorithm B randomly chooses r i , s ∈ Z q , and then computes
, where Bgets the warrant w and the identity ID i by the query of A. And then algorithm B outputs a proxy signing key psk pd = {y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 }. Similarly,
1 , x 1,1 , g s } is a valid proxy signing key.
= 1) or ∂ · H (w) = 0 mod q, then the above computation cannot be performed and the simulator will abort; otherwise, a proxy signing key psk pd is passed to the adversary A.
Signature Queries: (I) T = type1
Given a message M, the oracle returns a simulated standard IBS identity-based signature σ on M to A, which is valid with an identity ID i of the user i with i > 1. Thus, algorithm B randomly chooses r i , d ∈ Z q , and computes
Remark A.4. To the correctness of σ , σ may be changed as follows:
0 mod q, then the above computation cannot be performed and the simulator will abort; otherwise, a valid IBS σ is passed to the adversary A.
Given a message M and a warrant w, the oracle returns a simulated IBPS pσ on M and w to A, which is valid with respect to the corresponding identities. In the second situation, the user i is a delegator and is also a proxy signer (ID i is the identity of the user i with i > 1). Thus, algorithm B randomly chooses r i , s, d ∈ Z q , and computes
Lastly, B outputs an IBPS pσ
0 mod q, then the above computation cannot be performed and the simulator will abort; otherwise, a valid IBPS pσ is passed to the adversary A.
Given a message M and a warrant w, the oracle returns a simulated IBPS pσ on M and w to A, which is valid with respect to the corresponding identities. In the third situation, the user i is a delegator, so the user i needs to delegate his signing rights to the user 1 (ID i is the identity of the user i with i > 1). Thus, algorithm B randomly chooses r i , s, d ∈ Z q , and computes
then the above computation cannot be performed and the simulator will abort; otherwise, a valid IBPS pσ is passed to the adversary A.
Given a message M and a warrant w, the oracle returns a simulated IBPS pσ on M and w to A, which is valid with respect to the corresponding identities. In the fourth situation, the user 1 is a delegator, so the user 1 needs to delegate his signing rights to the user i (ID i is the identity of the user i with i > 1). Thus, algorithm B randomly chooses r i , s, d ∈ Z q , and computes
then the above computation cannot be performed and the simulator will abort; otherwise, a valid IBPS pσ is passed to the adversary A. Forgery: If algorithm B does not abort as a consequence of one of the queries above, the adversary A will, with probability at least ε, return a forgery according to the following situation:
The adversary A returns a message M * and a valid standard signature forgery for ID
, where A did not query req_sig(·) on input M * and did not query req_key() for ID * .
If a · · H (ID
= 1) and λ · H (M * ) = 0 mod q, then algorithm B computes and outputs
which is the solution to the given CDH problem.
The adversary A returns a message M * , and a valid identitybased self-PS forgery, pσ 
= 1) and ∂ · H (w * ) = 0 mod q and λ·H (M * ) = 0 mod q, then algorithm B computes and outputs
The adversary A returns a message M * , and a valid IBPS forgery, pσ 
which is the solution to the given CDH problem. Thus, we will provide an upper bound on the probability that B aborts. To make the analysis simpler, we will define the events E i , F i , T j , S j , R * , F * , S * as Then the probability of B not aborting is
It is easy to see that the events If the simulation does not abort, adversary A will create a valid signature forgery with probability at least ε. Algorithm B can then compute g ab from the forgery as shown above. The time complexity of algorithm B is dominated by the time for the exponentiations and multiplications in the queries. We assume that the time for integer addition and integer multiplication and the time for hash computation can both be ignored, and then the time complexity of algorithm B is t = t +O(q e ·(14·C mul +21·C exp )+q s ·(27·C mul +38·C exp )).
Thus, Theorem 7.1 follows.
